Türkiye’nin Fon Krizi: Denetim Zincirinin Stres Testi
Turkey’s current investment fund crisis is not merely a story of poor portfolio performance. It is a stress test of the country’s regulatory architecture, valuation practices, liquidity management, custody controls, and investor protection mechanisms. In September 2026, Turkish authorities halted transactions in a group of investment funds and initiated the liquidation of 131 funds managed by seven portfolio management companies. The most important element of the case, however, lies in the timeline. The Capital Markets Board of Türkiye stated that unusual price movements involving certain funds and low-free-float equities had already been observed in the final quarter of 2025. The issue was subsequently discussed by the Financial Stability Committee, followed by regulatory work and new investment fund rules. This chronology raises a legitimate institutional question: if the risk pattern had been identified months earlier, which warning signals were visible, which institutions received them, and whether investor losses could have been reduced through earlier intervention. Describing the entire episode as a “Ponzi scheme” would go beyond currently available evidence. A classic Ponzi structure uses money from new investors to pay earlier participants. The Turkish fund case may instead involve a more complex combination of illiquid assets, fragile valuations, concentrated positions, related-party exposures, and feedback loops in which rising reported returns attract new capital. The case also highlights the responsibilities of portfolio managers, custodians, market infrastructure institutions, and regulators. For affected investors, preserving transaction records, sales orders, account statements, written communications, and official responses is essential. Future investigations will need to establish not only where losses occurred, but also when warning signs became visible and whether the supervisory system responded quickly enough.